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Unfortunately, this ambitious thesis rests on a weak foundation.
Gibbs has researched local newspapers, the files of the Missouri
Council of Defense and other wartime organizations, and several let-
ter collections, but the documentation is quite limited in scope, fre-
quently anecdotal, and occasionally suggests a contradictory interpre-
tation. Do reports of suicides, self-mutilations, and hastily arranged
marriages support the view that Missourians had an unusual procliv-
ity for avoiding military service when Gibbs's own statistics indicate
that they volunteered at a rate more than seven percent above the
national average while their requests for deferments were within
national norms? His account of widespread nonparticipation in bond
drives is also less than convincing.
One of the most intriguing statements in the book comes in the
introduction, where Gibbs reports that "limited research" he con-
ducted in the eight states bordering Missouri indicates "that Missouri-
ans were not alone in their opposition and refusal to participate" (viii).
Although he makes no specific reference to Iowa, there are some
superficial impressions that he may be correct. During the months
before the 1916 gubernatorial contest between Republican William
Lloyd Harding and Democrat Edwin T. Meredith, Iowans engaged in a
lively debate over the respective merits of bureaucratic centralism
(modernization?) and local democracy (traditionalism?). At the center
of this conflict were two organizations, the Greater Iowa Association
and the United Taxpayers League. Whether the Iowa experience—
seemingly a conflict between those who wanted greater efficiency
and others alarmed by the loss of local autonomy—parallels events in
Missouri remains unclear, but after 1917 American involvement in the
war certainly accelerated the process of economic and political cen-
tralization. It would be worthwhile, therefore, to look at Iowa during
the war and determine whether Gibbs's thesis has wider implications.
By challenging historians to reexamine old assumptions, Gibbs has
written an important book. Even if additional research fails to sub-
stantiate his views, all of us who are interested in the response of
midwestemers to World War I are in his debt.
The Mild Reservationists and the League of Nations Controversy in the
Senate, by Herbert F. Margulies. Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 1989. ix, 300 pp. Tables, bibliography, index. $39.00 cloth.
REVIEWED BY FREDERICK C. ADAMS, DRAKE UNIVERSITY
Professor Margulies is convinced that if the United States had joined
the League of Nations, "the process by which Americans adjusted to
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twentieth-century international realities probably would have been
significantly accelerated" (273). Thus he is drawn to the Senate debate
over the Versailles Treaty in large part to try to figure out what went
awry. Since others have studied the actions of President Woodrow
Wilson, the Democrats, and the Irreconcilables (the Republican sena-
tors who opposed American participation in any type of international
organization), he concentrates on those senators who were known as
the Mild Reservationists. The latter consisted of moderate Republi-
cans who, though favoring American participation in the League, had
concerns about some aspects of the covenant. Because formal amend-
ments would have prolonged the overall ratification process. Mild
Reservationists proposed several "interpretations" of those clauses
that caused them the greatest uneasiness. They believed that this
approach would both allow the League of Nations to begin operations
in a timely fashion and protect American interests.
As Margulies admits, the Mild Reservationists faced an uphill
battle. One problem involved the size of the bloc: the group consisted
of only ten individuals. Since the Senate was nearly evenly divided
(forty-nine Republicans and forty-seven Democrats), they could not
by themselves provide the Democrats with the required two-thirds
majority needed for ratification. To be successful, they would have to
bring along several Republican fence-sitters (two of whom were from
Iowa: Albert Cummins and William Kenyon). But to do this, the Mild
Reservationists would have to insist on more rigid interpretations,
ones that the Democratic leadership likely would oppose. A second
problem was that they were caught in a contradictory situation. Their
hopes for ratification inclined them to work with the Democrats. But
their even stronger desire for a Republican victory in the 1920 presi-
dential election made it difficult for them to break party ranks. A third
problem was that Senate Majority Leader Henry Cabot Lodge was
very skillful at keeping the party unified behind a program that he
was confident Wilson would reject. Finally, Wilson and the Demo-
cratic leadership were unwilling to deal at a time when a compromise
seemed possible. Therefore, the Mild Reservationists did not have
much maneuvering room. They could not dictate the terms of the
debate, and their ability to influence events depended on the exis-
tence of conditions over which they had no control.
For the most part, Margulies is sympathetic to these well-
intentioned senators, believing that they "played reasonably well the
hand that was dealt them" (xiii). Unquestionably, he is correct to insist
that they were not responsible for the League's defeat. Whether the
topic needs a book-length study is another matter. There is an awful
lot of tedious detail and repetition that adds little to the main argu-
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ment. Also, Margulies does not explain how the volatile domestic set-
ting created a highly charged partisan environment in which moder-
ate and conservative Republicans were determined to defeat Wilson.
As Arno J. Mayer indicated more than twenty years ago, these groups
worried more about the progressive domestic implications of a Wilson
treaty victory than they did about American participation in the
League itself. Ultimately, class and partisan concerns triumphed, as is
evidenced by the Mild Reservationists' loyalty to Lodge.
Zig-Zag-and-Swirl: Alfred W. Lawson's Quest for Greatness, by Lyell D.
Henry, Jr. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1991. xix, 336 pp. Illus-
trations, notes, index. $29.95 cloth.
REVIEWED BY H. ROGER GRANT, UNIVERSITY OF AKRON
Few Americans now remember the versatile career of Alfred W.
Lawson (1869-1954), although more might recall him had he
exploited several opportunities for greatness. Born in England but
raised in Detroit, Lawson left home as a teenager and soon entered the
burgeoning world of professional baseball. He failed to establish him-
self as a player in the major leagues, but he achieved modest fame as
manager of minor-league teams and early organizer of barnstorming
trips to Cuba.
Lawson next turned to journalism and aviation. In 1904 he wrote
a Utopian novel. Born Again, in which he glorified the wonders of a
technologically advanced society. But rather than launch a perfect
society, Lawson became infatuated with the commercial possibilities
of aviation. He started two trade journals and after World War I built
an airplane for carrying large numbers of passengers. Even though his
test craft performed well, the endeavor collapsed financially. Lawson
seemingly possessed the knack for failing when success might have
been within reach. By the time of Lawson's aviation phase, those who
knew him realized that he was a talented albeit odd individual. One
associate aptly called him a "cross between a crackpot and a genius."
Lawson's crackpot inclinations became apparent during the
1930s. Concerned about the plight of victims of the Great Depression,
Lawson was one of the first to see the need for a crusade to uplift the
troubled. This he did with his Direct Credits Society, based in Detroit
and centered mostly in the Midwest. Lawson's blueprint for a better
America involved his "perfect economic plan"; he wanted abolition of
the gold standard and a cheap-money monetary policy. At the heart
of his scheme was the idea of interest-free loans from the federal gov-
ernment. Even though thousands of hard-pressed Americans gravi-
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